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THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT:
LEGITIMATING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE
Judith G. Greenberg*
INTRODUCTION
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)' has been effective in
making the most egregious and obvious forms of pregnancy
discrimination illegal. Thus, when four State Troopers in Massachusetts
recently complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
that they had been removed to "temporary modified duty" because of
their pregnancies, it took them less than a week to get reinstated
Unfortunately, the PDA has also acted as a shield behind which
employers can hide as they discriminate against their pregnant
employees? One court held that there was no discrimination if a woman
on pregnancy leave was fired as part of a reduction in the size of the
workforce merely because she happened to be oni leave at the moment
that the reduction took place.4 Another court held that it was not
pregnancy discrimination to fire a woman whom the employer feared
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law; B.A., C4rnel 1969; JD., Wsconsin.
1972, LLM, Harvard, 1979. This paper was presented at the Law, Feminism & the 21st Cenaury
Conference on April 4, 1998, in Portland, Maine. I would like to express my thanks to Erica
Jacobson for an extremely thorough reading of the manuscript and a detailed conversation about it.
The time and energy she put into this gives meaning to the term sisterhood. I would also like to
thank Davalene Cooper and Elizabeth Spahn for their comments, Monica Cborinult for
exceptionally fine research assistance, and Jenny Wriggis and the Maine Law Revew for
organizing the Law, Feminism & the 21st Cenury Conferece. This paper is dedicated to the
memory of my late friend and colleague, Mary Jo Frug, whose work. life, and death had a
tremendous influence on many of the participants at that confernce, including me.
1. 42U.S.C.§2000e(k)(1994). ThePDAisanamedmentto TinVI42U.S.C§2000e
(1994), which prolbits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of s. The PDA itself
provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
2. Ellen O'Brien, TrooperHit Work Curbs Over Pregnancy, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15,
1997, at Al; Julie Crittenden, Pregnant Trooper May Return to Duty. BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 18,
1997, at A7.
3. Othe cormrntators ha-v made simHlarcli. See Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Paretin&g
and Capitalism, 58 Oo ST. L J. 61, 61 (1997) (noting that U.S. courts have been hostile to
pregnancy discrimination claims).
4. See In re Carnegie Cr. Assoc., 129 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1997).
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might not return from a pregnancy leave.' Yet another court concluded
that there was no discrimination when a pregnant woman was fired after
her boss told her that new mothers should be home with their children.6
Women who lose their jobs in these settings are not, according to the
courts, discriminated against because of their pregnancies. Rather, they
just happened to be on the receiving end of irrelevant comments or
"neutral" criteria such as absence from the workplace that were used by
the employer to make important decisions. Embedded in the courts'
conceptions of neutrality and relevancy are a series of stereotypes about
pregnancy. The result is that the PDA permits discrimination based on
the very sort of stereotyping that it was expected to eradicate.7
There are two dominant stereotypes of pregnant women. Both are
inconsistent with the image of a good worker. One stereotype connects
pregnant women with the home. In one form or. another it says,
"Pregnant women are/should be preoccupied with their families."8 The
second classic stereotype portrays pregnant women as disabled by the
pregnancy-lazy, hysterical, or otherwise ill.9 It is important to
recognize two things about these sterotypes that are so convincing to the
courts. First, they represent only one side of the set of social stereotypes
about pregnancy. People also say of pregnant women that they appear
"radiant," "energized," or "more focused than ever before in their lives."
None of this shows up in the cases. Second, the stereotypes that do exist
are the stereotypes that are usually connected to pregnant white women.
Women of color, particularly Black women, are often thought of as
strong and able to work throughout their pregnancies. Breeding was part
of the job for slaves in the United States."
The courts have had difficulty defining what aspects of "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions" are protected by the statute.
By using a narrow, medicalized definition of pregnancy, they have
excluded the time that women take to care for young children from the
statute's protection." On the other end of the childbearing process, at
least one court has refused to recognize the connection between
infertility treatments and pregnancy. 2 The result is that women who
need to take time off from work for medical appointments or who want
5. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
6. See lhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Barbara
Presley Noble, An Increase in Bias is Seen Against Worker, N.Y. TM, Jan. 2, 1993, at 1
(describing continuing discrimination against pregnant women).
7. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L REV. 1118, 1128-42 (1986) (discussing stereotypes about
pregnancy).
8. See, e.g., Uhardtv. SamaLee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
10. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KI.UJNG THE BLACK BODY (1997).
11. The Family and Medical Leave Act now provides limited protection to women who take
time off without pay to be with their young children. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(IXA) (1994).
12. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
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their employer-provided health care coverage to pay the bills for their
infertility treatments may find themselves unprotected. These decisions
allow narrow stereotypes of a work-family dichotomy to influence their
definitions of pregnancy.
These problems do not indicate new forms of discrimination against
women in the workplace. More than twenty years ago, the United States
Supreme Court decided a pair of cases relating to pregnancy
discrimination. In them it held that failure to provide benefits for
pregnancy as part of a state disability insurance program or an
employer's disability plan was not discrimination on the basis of sex. 3
The Court's finding that there was no sex discrimination because "tihe
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and non-pregnant personse" 4 amazed many people. The result was the
enactment of the PDA to combat discrimination based on pregnancy. 5
Unfortunately, the elimination of pregnancy discrimination has
proven to be an elusive goal. In order to achieve this goal, we would
need to be able to identify exactly what is meant by "pregnancy," and
when one is discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy. Because
both of these issues require interpretation, we probably should not be
surprised that stereotyped cultural images have affected our
understanding of what constitutes pregnancy discrimination or that the
courts have silently relied on these stereotypes. The result has been that
instead of eradicating discrimination based on pregnancy, the PDA has
often served to legitimate it16
This Article focuses on three areas of pregnancy discrimination law
to illuminate the mechanisms through which stereotypes of pregnant
women have become part of the decisional process. Initially, I will
discuss the biological definition of pregnancy that courts use and the
ways in which this definition is used to make it appear as if women have
chosen against the workplace. Next, I will discuss mixed motive
13. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (in lving a state disability insurance
program and inteptmtion of the Equal Protection Clause); General Electric Co. v. Gilbet 429
U.S. 125 (1976) (involving an employer's disability plan and interpretation of Title VIE.
14. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
15. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79
(1983).
16. Many other commentators have also been critical of the PDA's inability to eradicate
discrimination on tde basis of pregnancy. See, e.g., D'Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable
Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L REv. 1411 (1996) (recommending amendments to the PDA to
include reasonable accommodaliotis); Deborah A. Calloway. Accommodating Pregnancy in the
Workplace, 25 SrESON L RE V. 1 (1995) (arguing in faror of requiring employe's to accommodate
pregnant women); Samuel sacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workpla.
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy. 94 COWM. L REV. 2154 (1994) (proposing the
socialization of pregnancy costs); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equalfry and
Antidiscrimination: Accommodatng Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilites Act, 82
GEO.LJ. 193 (1993) (recommending that pregnancy be included under the ADA).
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pregnancy cases in which the plaintiff wants to use a comment or
comments that the employer has made to her to show that her pregnancy
was a motivating factor in the making of the adverse employment
decision. Courts' failure to recognize the discriminatory animus demon-
strated by the employers' comments show the courts' own receptivity to
the stereotypes that underlie these comments. Finally, I will discuss the
search for comparative groups of nonpregnant employees with whom a
pregnant employee can compare herself in order to create a prima facie
case under the burden-shifting approach to establishing pregnancy
discrimination.17 This time the stereotypes show up in determining the
comparisons. As elsewhere, the stereotypes function to facilitate
decisions that pregnant women are different from the usual employees
and that, therefore, they can be excluded from the workplace without
such exclusion being illegal discrimination. In short, the subtle adoption
of classic stereotypes about pregnant women works to reinscribe the
traditional idea that pregnancy and the workplace do not mix.
DEFINING PREGNANCY, DEFINING WORK
Pregnancy discrimination litigation invariably raises the question of
what is "pregnancy." The cases define pregnancy in terms of a
biological process that begins with conception and ends with delivery."8
For example, Diana Piantanida's employer informed her, while she was
on maternity leave, that she would be given a new job upon returning
because she had not been satisfactorily performing at the old one. 9
When she returned to work, she was given a job that was described as "a
good job for a new mom" to handle.2" On deposition, she testified that
17. In discussing comparisons, I will try not to repeat the intense, stymied sameness-
difference debate of the 1980s. For an example of the difference position, see Wendy W. Williams,
Equaliy 's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985). For an example of the sameness position, see Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Seal Equaity, 75 CAL L REV. 1279 (1987). For criticisms of this non-
productive debate, see Finley, supra note 7, at 1142-63, and MARY JOE FkUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL
FEmwisM 3-11 (1992).
18. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Cir., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996)
(differentiating pregnancy and childbirth from infertility through their temporal relation to
conception). Although the cases frequently appear to describe conception and delivery as instants
in time, each actually is a process that takes place over a period of time. See Eizabeth Spahn &
Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law 32
U.S.F. L REV. 261 (1998) (discussing conception as occurring over a period of time). Most
women can attest to the fact that delivery is a long process and that the recovery therefrom is even
longer. Pregnancies can also end with miscarriages or abortions. For an example of a court that
found pregnancy discrimination when an employer fired a woman because she was the center of
controversy due to an alleged abortion, see Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th
Cir. 1996).
19. SeePiantanidav.Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116F.3d340,341 (8thCir. 1997).
20. Id. n.2; see also Noble, supra note 6, at I (noting that women returning from pregnancy
leaves often get pushed off the "fast track").
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she understood she was being given this modified job because "now I
have a new baby and I wouldn't be capable of doing the job."21 The
Eighth Circuit held that this was not discrimination on the basis that she
had been pregnant,' but rather discrimination predicated on her new
status of parenthood. There was nothing sex-based about this status
according to the court's analysis: Parenthood is "not based on the
gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and child-bearing, but
rather is based on a gender-neutral status potentially possessible by all
employees, including men and women who will never be pregnant! '
Biological processes cannot be separated so easily from the social
construction of pregnancy and gender. After all, there is no reason to
think that the employer also believed that its male employees who had
recently fathered children were unfit for demanding jobs. If only female
employees somehow become unfit as a result of the birth of children,
then the resulting unfitness would certainly appear to be both because of
pregnancy and because of gender.2 The court did not question the
employer's claim that parenthood was gender-neutral because, in many
contexts, it is. In this particular context, however, it is unlikely that
parenthood was treated in a gender-neutral mannerY
A second move that the Eighth Circuit makes in this case, which is
also common in analyses that attempt to separate a biological definition
from a socially constructed one, is to represent the pregnant woman as
having chosen her situation. Thus, in Piantanida the court refers to "an
individual's choice to care for a child." The implication is that
parenthood and Piantanida's career are somehow inconsistent. It is as
if she had chosen to ask for some special accommodation as a result of
having given birth. Nothing could be farther from the truth. She simply
wanted to return to work. Portraying her as being in this situation as a
matter of choice makes her "unfitness" and lack of ajob sound as if they
are not the employer's responsibility.
21. Piantanidav. Wyman Ctr., Inc. 116 F3d at 341 n.2.
22. Courts have found that thre can be discrirminaion on the basis of pregnancy even if onz
is no longer pregnant. See Piraino v. Int'l Orientation Resources, Inc., 84 F3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.
1996); Donaldson v. American Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (D. Colo. 1996).
23. Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc, 116 F3d at 342; see also Pearistein v. Statm Islnd
Univ. Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 260, 266 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the PDA does not cover
requests for leave following adoption). This position echoes the Supreme Court's commnt in
Gedldig that classifications based on pregnancy are not se-based. This %s exactly what
Congress intended to overturn in enacting the PDA.
24. ThMPDAexplicitlydefines discrimination "on the basis of sk" to include discrimination
on the basis of "pregnancy, chilbirth, orrelated medical conditions" 42 US.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
25. For what has become the classic discussion of the way in which workplae stm s
affect wome's fives, see Mary Joe Frog. Secuing Job Equaltyfor Women LaborMarket Hostility
to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L REV. 55 (1979).
26. Piantanidav.WynanCtr.,Inc, 116F.3dat342.
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The plaintiff in Maganuco v. Leyden Community High Sch. Dist.
21227 experienced a similar problem. She was a school teacher who
wanted to use her paid sick leave for a period of pregnancy-caused
disability, followed by a period of unpaid maternity leave. The school
district disallowed this because the collective bargaining agreement did
not permit teachers to follow a period of sick leave with any other form
of leave unless they continued to be disabled after their sick leave was
exhausted. Any objective observer looking at this clause could predict
that it would have its most significant effect on pregnant women who
expected to take consecutive pregnancy and maternity leaves. This
appears to be the ideal disparate impact case.
The court rejected a disparate impact challenge to the collective-
bargaining agreement, combining both the non-biological and choice
arguments into one:
The impact of the leave policy... is dependent not on the biological
fact that pregnancy and childbirth cause some period of disability, but
on a... schoolteacher's choice to forego returning to work in favor
of spending time at home with her newborn child. However, this
choice is not the inevitable consequence of a medical condition
related to pregnancy .... '
According to the court, the biological consequences of pregnancy are
limited and objectively ascertainable. They do not include a period of
time at home with a newborn. Why the court should be so certain of this
is not clear. What about the physical changes that come with lactation
or the suppression of lactation? Are they not medical conditions related
to pregnancy?29 What about the psychological changes of the
postpartum period and of bonding with a newborn?" The line between
"biological" and "non-biological" effects of pregnancy is simply not
self-evident in the way the court would have us believe it is. Instead, the
use of a biological definition of pregnancy and its sequelae is simply a
means of keeping women in their place. By defining pregnancy in terms
27. 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991).
28. lML at 444-45.
29. The courts have repeatedly answered this question in the negative. See Fejes v. Gilpin
Ventures, Inc, 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding that breast-feeding is not a
medical condition related to pregnancy within the meaning of the PDA); McNill v. New York City
Dep't of Correction, 950 F. Supp. 564, 569-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that breast-feeding is not
protected by the PDA). The courts see breast-feeding as relating to the child's physical condition,
not the mother's, and therefore not covered. What they do not consider is that delivery stimulates
the woman's body to lactate, and that a lactating woman would be extremely uncomfortable if she
were unable to relieve herself, including through breast-feeding. See DANFORTI's OBS'MrRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 168-69 (James R. Scott et al. eds., 7th ed. 1994). Of course, the lactation process
can be artificially aborted, see id at 172, but there is no reason why courts should consider this to
be the norm instead of lactation.
30. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROESCH, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEPRESSION 150-51 (1991)
(defining postpartum depression).
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of a narrow, biological series of processes, the court can reaffirm the
distinction between work and family, and reinforce the sterotypical
belief that women belong on the family side of the line.
The use of this definitive biological definition also allows the court
to say that the consequences of pregnancy are neither covered by the
PDA nor a matter of public policy, but instead are matters of individual,
private choice. Because the court does not interpret the period that the
plaintiff wishes to stay home to be necessary as a biological consequence
of pregnancy, it instead becomes a matter of the woman's own choice.
She, rather than the employer, is responsible for the adverse con-
sequences.
The courts have had similar problems in attempting to determine
where the protections of the PDA begin. A frequent question has been
whether or not it covers treatment for infertility. For several courts, the
United States Supreme Court's determination in International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America v. Johnson Controls, Inc."1 that the PDA covers treatment based
on the potential for pregnancy, as well as on-going pregnancies, has been
crucial.3  These courts-only district courts so far-have adopted a
considerably less biologically based definition of pregnancy and related
conditions. They have emphasized that before the passage of Title VII
and its amendment by the PDA, women wereoften discriminated against
because of their capacity to become pregnant. They were seen as
marginal workers.33 They were understood as imposing costs on the
employer because of their ability to become pregnant.3 Furthermore,
women with the potential to become pregnant were subject to
discrimination until they passed childbearing age.35 By focusing on
women's plans to become pregnant instead of on the physical pregnancy
itself,' the courts are focusing more on the social meaning of pregnancy
than on the biological changes that accompany it.
Even the courts that accept a social definition find it hard to let go
entirely of the possibility of using biology to define pregnancy. Thus,
they bolster their positions with help from biology. These courts em-
phasize that, "[w]hile infertility may well be gender-neutral, the ability
31. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
32. See, eg.,Cleesev.Hewlett-PackardCo.,911 F.Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1995) (citing
Johnson Controls); Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316,
319 (ND. 111. 1995) (describing Johnson Controls as controlling); P,.ourkv. Inland Steel Co.,. 858
F. Supp. 1393, 1401-02 (N.D. IlL 1994) (discussing Johnson Controls).
33. See Pacourekv. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. at 1402 (citing Senate floor debate on the
PDA).
34. SeeErickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 911 F. Supp. at 320
(referring to legislative history).
35. See id.
36. See, eg., Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp.at 1318.
1998]
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to become pregnant clearly is not."'3 This observation is essential to
show that the plaintiff has been discriminated against "because of...
sex."'3 It also recenters the discussion on women's biological capacity.
Similarly, the Pacourek court describes the PDA's coverage as being
comprised of concentric circles, with actual pregnancy in the innermost
circle. 9 Problems relating to the initiation of pregnancies would be in
the next circle. This, too, recenters the discussion on women's bio-
logical capacity.
This reversion to the biological is likely to be problematic for women
seeking protection under the PDA. In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical
Ctr./°4 the Eighth Circuit, the only circuit court to speak on this issue so
far,41 held that an employer did not violate the PDA by excluding
coverage for fertility treatments from its health plan. Staking out a
biologically reductionist position, the court said that pregnancy and
childbirth occur after conception and are "strikingly different" from
infertility, which prevents conception.42 The endorsement of this narrow
biological definition of pregnancy allowed the court to separate the
realm of work from the realm of women. Because the exclusion of
infertility treatment from the health plan was not considered
discrimination, the employer was within its rights to base its exclusion
on the fear that it employed "too many" women of childbearing age
whose infertility treatments might result in multiple births and increased
costs for the health plan.43 What does "too many" women mean?
Presumably the company's vice-president, from whose statement the
court was quoting, was thinking only in terms of costs to the firm. The
implication, however, is that women impose costs on the business that
men do not, and therefore they (or their womeny aspects-the ability to
become pregnant) should be excluded from the business. Again, this is
an example of how the biological definition of pregnancy is being used
to exclude women's issues from the workplace.
DEROGATORY COMMENTS, STEREOTYPING, AND DIRECr EVIDENCE
Pregnancy discrimination cases are usually disparate treatment, not
disparate impact, suits.' Disparate treatment cases may be proven in
37. 1, at 1317.
38. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
39. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. at 1403.
40. 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
41. See id at 679.
42. See id
43. See id at 680.
44. Disparat treatment cases involve intentional discrimination against a target on the basis
of a prohibited classification, such as pregnancy. Disparate impact cases involve the application
of "neutral," facially non-discriminatory criteria that have a disproportionate impact on members
of a protected class. See HARoLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVLRIGHTs AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIdINATION
LAW § 4.1 (1997). Occasionally pregnancy discrimination cases are litigated as disparate impact
[Vol. 50:225
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either of two ways. Plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence of
discrimination may proceed according to what courts call the "now
familiar" burden-shifting process set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green and Texas Dep't of Conmmwity Affairs v. Burdine. Plaintiffs
who are fortunate enough to have direct evidence must simply show that
improper reliance on a protected classification was a "motivating factor"
in the defendant's decision, although there may also have been other
reasons for the decision. If the plaintiff can make this showing, then
the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, who must show that it
would have taken the same action, even without the impermissible
motivating factor, if it wants to avoid an award of damages or
reinstatement against it. In mixed-motive cases, as in burden-shifting
cases, it is often next to impossible to prove that the employer's conduct
was motivated by discriminatory animus because of rules about what
kind of data counts for these purposes.
Often, plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases want to prove the employer's
discriminatory animus by using antagonistic comments that supervisors
or employers have made to them. Courts have greatly restricted,
however, what they will allow to be considered as evidence in these
mixed-motive cases. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that, in order for the plaintiff to satisfy her burden of showing that the
defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, she must produce a
"smoking gun": direct evidence that the employer was motivated by
animus toward her because of her membership in a protected class.49
According to the First Circuit, a plaintiff might meet this requirement if
she received "an admission by the employer that it explicitly took actual
or anticipated pregnancy into account in reaching an employment
decision"--an admission that most employers are too clever to make.5'
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in a decision this past January, required
that the comments be made "contemporaneously and directly in
cases. See, eg., Maganuco v. lgyden Community Igh Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.
1991); Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen, 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996); see also
Miflsap, szqra note 16, at 1422 (noting that the Supreme Court has neer explicitly recognized the
existence of a disparate impact cause of action for pregnancy discriminrion).
45. 411 U.S. 792(1973).
46. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228. 250
(1989); Geierv. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238,241 (7th Cir. 1996). See geeraUly LEw supra note
44 § 4.5.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe5(g)(B)(i), (ii) (1994).
49. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413,421 (Ist Cir. 1996).
50. Id.
51. But see Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving a race
discrimination case in which the defendant bluntly told Iispanic plaintff that she was not promoted
because she was not a Black man).
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connection with the adverse employment decision."' This too is a
requirement that most employers know enough not to meet. ?
While the courts recognize discrimination in these cases only if
defendants baldly state their dislike or distrust of pregnant women,
preferably just as they are making the employment decision, people's
true feelings about pregnant women are likely to be revealed in their
casual conversations when they are less inhibited by the recognition that
their actions and words are formally operative.'" For example, how
should we interpret the following? The plaintiff, Holly-Anne Geier,
worked as a sales representative for the defendant. She was "something
less than a model employee,"55 frequently late for work, lying to her
supervisor, neglecting to return customers' messages, and falling below
the established quotas. As a result of these difficulties, she was on and
off of probation even before she became pregnant. Nevertheless, from
the moment she got married, her supervisor, Roberts, was clearly
troubled by the possibility that she would become pregnant and that this
would cause him to have to work harder. As soon as she returned from
her honeymoon, he asked her if she intended to have children. The court
does not recount her reply, but we can assume it was positive because he
then retorted, "'Have all the kids you would like-between spring,
summer, and fall. I will not work your territory during the winter
months."'" This conversation took place during a long car trip, not
during a discussion of her job performance or of her frequent stints on
probation. Ten months later, she was at home recovering from a
miscarriage when Roberts called her to say, "'Get out of your GLd d__n
bed and call your accounts if you want to keep your f -- g job."'57
She returned to work (again on probation) within a week of his abusive
call. That was in October of 1991. By January of 1992, she was
pregnant once more and so informed Roberts. Barely waiting for the
news to settle, he fired her within two weeks.5"
52. Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431,436 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Geier
v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238,242 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that to be indicative of discriminatory
animus, the remark must be "contemporaneous with the discharge or causally related to the
discharge decision making process").
53. In the Deneen case, however, a Northwest Airlines employee actually did make
comments to Deneen in connection with a recall from lay-off status that showed its discriminatory
animus toward pregnant women. The Eighth Circuit therefore upheld the district court's entry of
judgment for Deneen. See Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d at 438-39.
54. See Charles R. Lawrence I The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L REV. 317, 340-41 (1987) (suggesting that stereotypes that are
ordinarily repressed may slip out during casual conversation).
55. Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d at 240.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 241.
58. See id
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It is exactly comments like these (combined with timing like this) 9
that are most likely to disclose the defendant's true attitude toward a
pregnancy by the plaintiff. On a long car trip, Roberts is likely to have
expressed himself in an uninhibited manner. What he was declaring was
a clear anxiety that a pregnancy by the plaintiff would result in more
work for him. While the court subsequently characterized the comment
as indicating only an unwillingness to accept winter absences due to
childbirth, it is hard not to also see in it Roberts's resentment that he
might be called upon to work plaintiff's territory in addition to his own
due to her pregnancy. The invasive phone call during her miscarriage
indicates a similar fear that her pregnancy might mean extra work for
him.
This would seem like a paradigmatic case for mixed-motive treatment.
On the one hand, the defendant's supervisor made multiple comments
indicating hostility to the idea of plaintiff's being pregnant and fired her
within weeks of her announcement of her renewed pregnancy. On the
other hand, there was also the distinct possibility that the plaintiff was
fired for not performing well on the job. The Seventh Circuit, however,
did not interpret Roberts's comments as indicative of animus toward the
plaintiff's pregnancy or toward the possibility of her pregnancy. The
court characterized the warning during the car trip as merely a "casual
conversation during a long car trip," which was insufficient to create a
showing of discrimination under the direct evidence approach because
it was neither contemporaneous with her dismissal nor did it have a
causal nexus to it 6' The court recognized the brutal comments after
Geier's miscarriage as "insensitive," "unconscionable," and "repre-
hensible," but, again, not as causally connected to her dismissal."
How did the court arrive at this last conclusion? It asserted that the
plaintiff had not proven that the comments reflected on her pregnancy
rather than her absence from work.'m If comments like Roberts's are not
enough to meet the plaintiff's initial burden of showing that anti-
pregnancy animus was a motivating factor, plaintiffs will indeed be
required to come up with the impossible smoking gun.
Geieris not the only case in which the courts discount the potency of
remarks made by defendants that illustrate hostility to employees'
pregnancies. Other courts have downplayed employers' suggestions that
pregnant women should not return to work after their pregnancies but
rather should remain at home with their children,' that pregnant women
59. See Tmupev. May Dep't Stes Co., 20 F.3d 734.736 (7th Cir. 1994) (tecogniing the
importance of suspicious timing to plaintiffs proof in mixed-motive cases).
60. See Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d at 242.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See lRhardt v. Sara Lee Corp. 118 F3d 1151. 1156 (7th Cir. 1997) (octing that the
employer thought mothers of young children should stay at home); EEOC v. North Westlr Mn'l
Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. nlL 1994) (maintaining that the fact that the emplo)-cr L three
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do not perform well at work,' are repeatedly pregnanto should focus on
their families,6 or should not be pregnant and unmarried.'
These cases illustrate the important, but subtle, ways in which
traditional ideas about women and pregnancy still continue to influence
courts' thinking. In Geier, the court understood Roberts's comments as
indicating that he was really thinking that a pregnancy would mean more
work for him. The members of the judiciary, like most of the rest of
society, have been socially conditioned to think about women's
pregnancies as disabling. This interpretation resonates with stereotypes
and is convincing exactly because of its easy fit with them.
Unfortunately, this does not make it the more likely interpretation of
Roberts's words. In fact, in the particular sales job that Holly-Anne
Geier held, the court did not indicate any reason to believe that Geier
would need a maternity leave of more than a few weeks. If she remained
healthy, she could be expected to continue working until quite close to
the baby's birth and then to return to work within a matter of weeks.
The case itself demonstrates that she could keep up with her work during
that period by making telephone calls from home. If all this is true, then
Roberts's fear of extra work is based on the outmoded belief that
pregnant women cannot participate in paid work. This is exactly the
type of stereotyped judgment that the PDA was intended to eliminate
from employment decisions. Certainly the same is true about employ-
ment decisions motivated, even in part, by the idea that women should
stay at home with their children instead of participating in the paid
workforce. Pregnant women should not be forced to choose between
work and home as if these were separate and irreconcilable realms.6"
In other instances, the employer's comments do not even get
discussed by the courts in making their decisions, or, if they are
discussed, they are rejected as clearly not relevant. Thus, for example,
in In re Carnegie Cr. Assocs.," when Deborah Rhett disclosed her
pregnancy to her supervisors, they immediately asked if she was going
different comments indicating that the mother of a young child should be at home may not be
directly connected to the challenged employment decision).
64. See Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs, 982 F. Supp. 213,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that the plaintiff "worked better before [her leave]").
65. See id ("Here we go again.").
66. See McDonnell v. Certified Eng'g & Testing Co., 899 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D. Mass.
1995) ("[N]ow that [McDonnell) was pregnant, she had more important things [than work] to be
concerned about.").
67. See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290,293 (3d Cir. 1997).
68. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacormn Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995), in
which the Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case tried on the direct
evidence theory. As part of her evidence, the plaintiff proved that her supervisor, upon seeing her
obviously pregnant, had said he was surprised with her condition because he had always believed
her to be a "career woman." See id at 1348. This statement is objectionable exactly because of its
conventional assumption that pregnant women cannot be dedicated to their careers.
69. 129 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 50:225
PREGNANCYDISCRIMINATION ACT
to get married and one said, "in society's eyes ... [it was] the right thing
to do."7 This comment, and the immediate questions about her marriage
prospects, disclose a good deal about the supervisor's discomfiture with
Rhett's pregnancy as a single woman. Despite this, they are not even
considered when the court discusses the plaintiff's evidence in proof of
her mixed-motive case. Because the court does not discuss them, we
have no way of knowing why it disregarded them. One explanation is
that the court omitted any analytical reference to the comments because
the court did not see them as indicative of any unusual level of animus
toward pregnant employees. One explanation for the court's failure to
discuss the comment is that the court also felt uncomfortable with the
idea of an unmarried pregnant woman in the workplace. Thus, it did not
see the employer's comments as evidence of discrimination. Instead, it
saw the comments as natural and innocuous.
In McDonnell v. Certified Engineering & Testing Co.,7 the plaintiff
had announced her pregnancy, and then, on the same day, been told that
her employment was being terminated The following day, when she
went to say good-bye to one of her supervisors, he.commented that now
that she was pregnant she had "more important things to be concerned
about: ' This comment was not considered by the court in its analysis
of the strength of the plaintiff's discrimination case. This could be
because the court considered the plaintiff's case to be clear and strong
without it 4 But, if that was the situation, why does the court see the
comment as adding nothing? Perhaps, in the court's mind, the comment
was self-evident: pregnant women do have more important things than
the workplace to think about. As with In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., if the
court understood the comment as clearly accurate, then it would not be
likely to recognize its demeaning implications: pregnant women should
not bother their little heads with anything but the thought of the life
growing within them. Again, this is exactly the type of stereotyped
approach to pregnancy and the workplace that the PDA was intended to
prevent.
One of the most complicated and troubling of the cases decided under
the PDA is Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.'s The plaintiff in
Troupe had worked for May Department Stores for three years before
she became pregnant. Her work was considered completely satisfactory.
Upon becoming pregnant, she developed terrible morning sickness. She
requested, and was given, part-time status, working from noon to 5:00
70. Id. at 293.
71. 899 F. Supp. 739 (D. Mass. 1995). McDownel is atualy decided ud the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting approach, but the court's failure to discus the cmployr's dmoguory
comment is relevant in this context See id. at 745.
72. See id. at 741.
73. Id. at 744.
74. The court rejected Certified's motion for summaryjudgment. See id. at 741.753.
75. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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p.m. As Jpdge Posner described the situation in his opinion for the
Seventh Circuit:
Partly... because she slept later under the new schedule, so that noon
was "imorning" for her, she continued to experience severe morning
sickness at work, causing what her lawyer describes with
understatement as "slight" or "occasional" tardiness. In the month
that ended with a warning from her immediate supervisor ... she
reported late to work, or left early, on nine out of the 21 working
days.76
Troupe was fired one day before she was scheduled to begin maternity
leave. On the way to the meeting at which she was fired, she was told
by her immediate supervisor that she was to be fired because the
supervisor didn't believe that she would return to work after the baby
was born.n
Troupe claimed that this, together with the timing of her firing, was
direct evidence of discrimination. She argued that the reason for her
firing could not have been the employer's fear that continued lateness on
her part would result in continued disruption of the business. After all,
she was due to begin a maternity leave. The employer could hire
someone to replace her while she was on leave, and there was no reason
to think she would continue to be late after the maternity leave was over
and the pregnancy was finished.78 Troupe argued that the plausible
explanation for her firing was that the employer did not believe that she
would return to work when her maternity leave was over-a common
stereotype about pregnant women. According to Judge Posner, this
would not be a violation of the PDA unless she could prove that a male
about to take a long-term, health-based leave would not have been fired
also. As he wrote: "Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as
they treat similarly affected but non-pregnant employees. 79 It was up
to Kimberly Hem Troupe to prove that nonpregnant persons were treated
differently.80
This is a case in which two common stereotypes about pregnant
women reinforce each other, making it that much easier for the court to
see the plausibility of the employer's position and making the
employee's position appear implausible. First, there is the stereotype
that women who take maternity leaves do not return. Her supervisor, a
woman, had already accepted the truth of this stereotype in relation to
Troupe. This stereotype is particularly convincing because of traditional
beliefs that pregnant women and mothers of young children do not
76. d at 735.
77. See id at 734-36.
78. See id at 737.
79. Id at 738.
80. For a discussion of the difficulties of locating appropriate comparative groups, see infra
notes 86-125 and accompanying text.
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belong in the workforce 1 The employer was willing to assume this of
Troupe only because she was a woman.
Second, there is the stereotype that pregnant women are "fat and
lazy."' Although the court here says nothing about Troupe's size, it
does imply that she is lazy.' After her schedule was altered to help her
accommodate her morning sickness, "she slept later... so that noon was
'morning." '' The implication is that she was simply too indolent to get
herself up and vomiting at a decent hour of the morning. Once the court
has accepted the image of Troupe as slothful in the mornings, it is easy
to extend that to the rest of her activities. It reinforces the impression
that she will be too lazy to return to work after her leave. Furthermore,
her attorney's legal work is portrayed as equally lacking in initiative.
According to the court, she could not prove her case without finding a
comparative group of nonpregnant employees who were similarly
situated and treated better. Of this, the court said:
We doubt that finding a comparison group would be that difficult.
Troupe would be halfway home if she could find one non-pregnant
employee of Lord & Taylor who had not been fired when about to
begin a leave similar in length to hers. She either did not look, or did
not find.!
Thus, the implicit acceptance of the image of pregnant women as lazy
affects the court's understanding not only of the employer's
discriminatory comment but also of the pregnant woman's ability to
make her case.
The stereotypes of pregnant women that are accepted in these cases
also support the notion that pregnancy is inconsistent with satisfactory
performance in the paid work force. Pregnant women are viewed as
undependable: they are late to work; they are unlikely to return after
their leaves; and, after delivery, their minds are, or should be, on the
children they have left at home. If the quality of Troupe's lawyer's work
is implicitly connected to her laziness, one can anticipate that her own
work as a pregnant woman would be judged equally harshly. Indeed,
numerous pregnant plaintiffs claim that the negative comments or
81. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co.. 20 F.3d at 737.
82. See Oliphant v. Perkins Restaurants Operating Co., 885 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (D. Kn.
1995) (stating that an employer accused an employee of using "pregnancy as an c== for absence
from work" and called pregnant vmen "unproductive and lazy"); see also Ann C. McGinley &
JefreyW. Stempel, Condescending Contradiions: Richard Posner s Pragrrat= and Pregnancy
Discrimination, 46 RA. L REV. 193 (1994) (arguing that the Troupe opinion is flawed, in part
because it takes a deprecatory position in relation to Kunberly Hera Troupe).
83. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co. 20 F.3d at 735; see also Colker, supra note 3. at
79-80 (noting that Troupe blames the plaintiff for her problems at work).
84. Troupe v. May.Dep't Stores Co, 20 F.3d at 735.
85. Id. at 739.
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evaluations began only after they announced their pregnancies. 6
Stereotypes about pregnant women emphasize their unfitness for work
in the market. Tacit acceptance of these stereotypes-indeed, a failure
to denounce them-reinforces the idea that pregnant women do not
belong in the workplace.
BURDEN-SHIFtING, COMPARISON GROUPS, AND STEREOTYPES
If the Pregnancy Discrimination Act protects women who are
pregnant against any form of discrimination, one would expect it to
protect women who are on pregnancy leave from being fired merely
because they are on leave. Yet, it does not do this. This scenario usually
occurs in situations in which the employer needs to reduce its workforce.
It then chooses to eliminate the job position occupied by the pregnant
woman. It chooses her position merely because she is on leave. For
example, in Ulloa v. American Express Travel Related Serv.," the
defendant decided to eliminate a position from the customer service
department while the plaintiff was out on maternity leave. The
defendant had no specific policy for determining which employees were
to be terminated when a staff reduction was to occur; it chose the
plaintiff because she was on leave." According to the department's
manager, had she not been on leave, seniority and productivity would
have been utilized to determine whose job to cut. 9 The court ruled that
the defendant had not violated the PDA.' ° Similarly, in Crnokrak v.
Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., the plaintiff, on pregnancy leave, lost
her supervisory job when a co-worker complained of feeling underpaid.
The co-worker was promoted into the plaintiff's position, and the
plaintiff was told by the supervisor that "she had been 'in the wrong
place at the wrong time,' and that had she not been out on pregnancy
leave she would not have been replaced."' The employer defended
against the employee's pregnancy discrimination suit on the grounds that
she had been terminated because she had been out of the office on leave,
86. See infra text accompanying notes 86-125 (discussing the difficulties of locating
appropriate comparative groups); see also Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d at 735-36.
87. 822 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
88. See id at 1571. Although Ms. Ulloa had exceeded her leave, testimony indicates that
had she not been on leave, other criteria might have resulted in her retention. See id at 1569.
89. See id Had these criteria been used, the plaintiff would have scored high in terms of
productivity. In the year before she took her leave, the defendant had called her the most productive
employee in the unit In that same year, the defendant had recognized the quality of Ms. Ulloa's
work in its performance appraisal and had given her the "Star Performer Award" for five of the
months of that year. Moreover, others in her unit were retained even though they had less seniority
than the plaintiff. See id. at 1567-69.
90. See id. at 1571-72.
91. 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. I1. 1993).
92. Il at 739.
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not because she was pregnant. 3 The court accepted this as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the employer's action. 4
Finally, just last fall, the Third Circuit decided In re Carnegie Ctr.
Assocs. As in Ulloa, the employer in Carnegie decided while the clai-
mant, Deborah Rhett, was on pregnancy leave that it needed to reduce
the size of its workforce. Rhett was one of four secretaries in her depart-
ment. While she was on leave, Carnegie hired a temporary secretary to
take her place. When it came time to reduce the number of secretaries
in the department, Rhett's position was eliminated because "it was easy
to abolish her former position by not hiring any more temps." 5 The
Third Circuit was very clear about the issue in the case, stating- 'The
main issue on this appeal is whether an employee's absence on maternity
leave can be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination." 9
It also acknowledged that, "Carnegie has made no showing that Rhett's
position would have been eliminated if she had not been away at the
time."' The court then held that it did not violate the PDA for an
employer who wanted to reduce the size of the workforce to fire a
woman on pregnancy leave simply because she was absent from the
office.98
How can it possibly be that conduct that so blatantly discriminates
against pregnant women is permissible under a statute intended to
outlaw exactly such pregnancy discrimination? Doctrinally, the problem
is that a plaintiff must be able to show that she has been treated
differently than those who are not members of the protected class have
been treated in the same situation." For some plaintiffs, this is a catch
twenty-two. Often there is no one else who has been in plaintiff's situ-
ation, or, if there are others, they are all members of the protected
class-pregnant women. The problem is more complicated than this,
however. Comparing the treatment of a pregnant woman to that of
someone similarly situated, but not a member of the protected class,
requires a delineation of what constitutes "similarly situated:' To do
this, the courts must understand which of plaintiff's characteristics are
part and parcel of her pregnancy and which are not. This is where the
use of stereotypes enters the analysis, yet again.
In cases like Ulloa, Crnokrak, and In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., the
plaintiff claims that defendant's actions, such as firing her merely be-
cause she was on pregnancy leave, should be considered indicative of in-
tent to discriminate despite the absence of blatant evidence of
93. See id at 743.
94. See id.
95. In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290.293 (3d Cir. 1997).
96. Id. at 294.
97. Id. at 296.
98. See id. at 297.
99. See Colker, supra note 3, at 79 (asserting the impossibility of identifying approprinae
comparison groups).
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discrimination. Cases like these are litigated under the burden-shifting
approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."0 ° Under this
approach, the plaintiff initially must make a showing of a prima facie
case against the defendant. The prima facie case consists of four
elements."°' First, the plaintiff must show that she is a member of a
protected class. Here, that is accomplished by proof of her pregnancy.
Next, she must show both that she was the subject of an adverse
employment decision and that she was qualified for the position or
benefit sought. Finally, in order to make a prima facie case, she must
show that employees who are not members of the protected class were
treated better than she was. The plaintiff's burden in showing a prima
facie case is relatively light." If the plaintiff is successful in making a
showing of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to state a non-discriminatory reason for the employment
decision. Once the employer has done that, the burden returns to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer's stated reason is only a pretext for
discrimination. 3
In determining whether or not an employer's conduct is pretextual,
plaintiffs can use much of the same kind of evidence as they use in
showing direct discrimination. Thus, timing is important in establishing
a pretext, just as it is in establishing direct discrimination. 4 Comments
showing the employer's bias against the protected characteristic are also
important. In one case in which a supervisor, upon learning of the
plaintiff's pregnancy, had thrown her a key chain with a condom
attached and said, "'[Miake sure after you have this baby you use this so
that we won't have to worry about you going on maternity leave again,"'
the court found the remark relevant to both the direct discrimination and
burden shifting approaches. 5
100. 411 U.S. 792(1973).
101. SeeEnsley-Gaines v.Runyon, 100F.3d 1220, 1224 (6th Cir. 1996);Geierv.Medtronic,
99 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996); see also LEwIS, supra note 43.
102. See Knezevic v. Hipage Co, 981 F. Supp. 393,395 (E.D.N.C. 1997).
103. See Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211,1214 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith v. F.W.
Morse & Co, 76 F.3d 413,421 (Ist Cir. 1996); see also LEWIS, supra note 44, § 4.4.
104. See, eg., Piraino v. International Orientation Resources, Inc., 84 F.3d 270,276 (7th Cir.
1996); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co, 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1995); McDonnell v.
Certified Eng'g & Testing Co, 899 F. Supp. 739,749 (D. Mass. 1995).
105. Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737,743-44 (N.D. 111. 1993).
In contrast, at least one court in the same district as the Crnokrak court has held that employer
statements that may not lrove a case under the direct discrimination approach because they do not
fit the nexus and contemporaneousness requirements will provide an inference of pretext under the
burden-shifting approach. In EEOC v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ill.
1994), the plaintiff's supervisor had firquently made comments to the effect that women should stay
home with their children. See idL at 766. The court found that although these comments may not
have been sufficiently connected to the actual employment decision to meet the plaintiffs burden
in a direct evidence case, they would allow the court to find that the employers's claimed neutral
reason for dismissing the plaintiff was a pretext. See id at 767.
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The aspect of the burden shifting approach that pregnant plaintiffs
find most problematic is the requirement that they be able to show that
similarly situated non-members of the class were treated better than the
pregnant plaintiff was treated." 6 Because this showing is a part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, inability to demonstrate that nonpregnant
employees were treated differently is fatal to the plaintiff's action.'t
This requirement is particularly hard on pregnant plaintiffs because
frequently there are no other employees who are "similarly situated" to
the pregnant woman."ns Remember Deborah Rhett in In re Carnegie Ctr.
Assocs., the plaintiff whose job was eliminated while she was on
pregnancy leave?"° The employer claimed that this was simply part of
a reduction in force accomplished through the elimination of her leave
position; Rhett claimed it was pregnancy discrimination.' As part of
her prima facie case, she was required to prove that others on long leaves
had not had their positions eliminated. Unfortunately for her, as the
court noted, "it was difficult... to make such a showing because
Carnegie never ha[d] had an employee on disability leave for a
protracted period for a reason other than pregnancy." '' As a result,
Rhett lost her case.
- Although it is unusual for a court to admit that there is no comparable
group of nonpregnant employees with whom the plaintiff can compare
herself, locating such a group is frequently very difficult. This is
because pregnancy is a unique condition and imposes unique burdens on
women who become pregnant. When else would you find a previously
satisfactory worker who suddenly begins to be egregiously late for work
106. This requirement may be part either of the fourth element of the prima fade case or of
proving that the employes assertd legitimat reason was mezlyapt SeelnreCamegieCtr.
Assocs., 129 F.3d 290,297-98 (3d Cir. 1997).
107. Some courts require a smilar showing as part ofa mixed-motive case in dich the
plaintiffneeds to prove that she was intentionally discriminated against becaau of her pregnany.
See, e.g, Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F3d 734,738 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff
who was routinely late becase ofmorning sickness failed to meet her burden because she had not
proven that the employer ignored simlar absees of nonpregnant employes). Placing the burden
on the plaintiff to make such a showing in a mixed-motive case is v.Tong, hot ever, bcas the
plaintiff's burden is only to show that the employer had a discriminatory motive, while the
defendant then has the burden of showing that it had a legitimate business reason. Ifplaintiff can
show a discriminatory motive, as the plaintiffdidin Troupe, through the us cofemplo)r co
and the timing of the firing, see id at 735-36, then the burden should be on the employer to show
the legitimacy of its reason by proving that it has applied the sam: rationale to other emplo)
similarly situated to the plaintiff. See Geier v. Medtroni, Inc. 99 F.3d 238,243 (7th Cir. 1996)
(requiring the plaintiffto discuss comparison group as part ofthe direct evidence method ofproof).
108. Ofcourse, this is not alwhys the case. Occasionally th-eplaintiffis lucky enough to have
aready-made comparison group. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lutheran Family Ser, 884 F. Supp. 1022,
1029-30 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (comparing leave periods and consideration of likelihood of need for
additional leave in the plaintiff's case and in cases of employees seking disability leave).
109. See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290,293 (3d Cir. 1997).
110. Seeid.
Ill Idat297.
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(because of morning sickness), whose lateness can be expected to
continue for numerous weeks, who has a scheduled leave coming up, and
who can be expected to return after that leave with no further lateness
issues? These facts are taken from Troupe in which the court said that
it doubted that finding a comparison group would be very difficult." 2 In
another case, the plaintiff had a difficult time finding others who were
"similarly situated" because she was working only part-time-because
she had young children."' There is another case in which a plaintiff
with superior evaluations requested consideration for an open promotion
and was told that she would not be promoted bedause she would be
going out on pregnancy leave. Again, the court held against the plaintiff
because she had not shown that a position had previously been held open
for an in-house male candidate who was on a'long leave.1 4 As with
Troupe, how often will this constellation of facts exist?
These cases are similar to cases in which the pregnant plaintiff's work
record is seriously blemished because of problems that are not derived
from the pregnancy. Two courts of appeals have recently held that, in
order to make the required prima facie showing, the plaintiff in such a
situation must also locate a nonpregnant employee with all the faults of
the pregnant employee, and show that the nonpregnant employee was
treated better than the plaintiff." 5 As with other cases in which the
plaintiff must locate a comparative group of employees, in these
situations it will be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to find another
employee who has demonstrated the same work faults and who made the
same request for leave or reinstatement as she did.
It should be clear from this discussion that locating a comparison
group of nonpregnant employees is crucial. It is crucial not just because
of the role it plays in establishing plaintiff's case but also because of
what it tells us about the courts' understanding of pregnancy. Who are
pregnant women like, and who are they unlike? This often raises the
question of whether pregnancy is a disability or whether pregnant
women are able-bodied workers. Do they belong at home or in the
workplace?
112. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d at 739 (7th Cir. 1994). To be fair to the
court, it did note that the plaintiff had not argued that there was no appropriate comparative group
and that "[w]hat to do in such a case is an issue for a case in which the issue is rased." Il
113. See Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff in
/lhardt is in this position not because of her present pregnancy, but rather because of her assumption
of a woman's cultural role of prime caretaker for young children. Thus, her position involves the
possibility of a combination of "discimination against her as a woman together with discrimination
because of her pregnancy. Asherv. Riser Foods, No. 92-3357, 1993 WL 94305 (6th Cir. Mar. 30,
1993) also involves a pregnant plaintiff who is working part-time, but it is not clear from the
opinion if that is related to previous pregnancies.
114. See Zoleke v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. 88C8080, 1992 WL 175526 at *1, *4 (N.D. III. Jul.
23, 1992).
115. See Ceier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238,241 (7th Cir. 1996); DeJamette v. Coming,
Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Often pregnant women are compared to the disabled. This invokes a
common stereotyped image of pregnant women-women who because
of their condition are too tired, too large, or too emotional to carry on
their normal activities. In looking for a point of comparison for the
employer's treatment of the pregnant woman and pregnancy leaves,
courts frequently ask whether the plaintiff has shown that the employer
would have treated a similarly disabled, nonpregnant employee's request
for a leave more favorably."6
In Troupe, in which the Seventh Circuit decried the plaintiff's failure
to find even one similarly situated employee as a point of comparison,
the court addressed the issue of whether dismissing an employee for fear
that she would not return from a pregnancy leave would be
discrimination under the PDA." 7 In order to answer the question, the
court felt that it had to imagine a comparable nonpregnant employee, and
the employer's treatment of him. Who is this imaginary comparable
employee? "[A] black employee scheduled to take a three-month paid
sick leave for a kidney transplant."" But, are pregnancy and a kidney
transplant really comparable? The heavy demand for transplant organs
means that the kidney transplant candidate may have been on the waiting
list for a donor kidney for quite some time, during which he may have
been getting sicker and sicker. This may have interfered seriously with
his work. After the transplant, he is likely to continue to be on anti-
rejection medication that will undermine his immune system, making
continuing absences more likely."9 Finally, the transplant patient may
imagine himself as a sick person as a result of the underlying kidney
disease, the operation, and the long recovery period. This too may affect
him as a worker. The pregnant employee, in contrast, may not have been
ill before the delivery and may return from it in excellent shape. She is
unlikely to see herself as an invalid. The courts' approach to
comparative thinking encourages us to think about pregnancy as an
illness or disabling condition."z It is not surprising that if we think
about it in that way, we will discover all kinds of reasons why the
(disabled) pregnant woman is unable to work. Once again, the structure
of anti-discrimination law is built on traditional stereotypes of
pregnancy. Their continued use creates doctrines that permit discrimin-
116. See Zoleke v. CNA Ins. Cos., 1992 WL 175526, at *4; In re Camregi Ctr. Assocs, 129
F.3d at 297.
117. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co, 20 F.3d at 738.
118. d The court chose aBlack employee as away of thinking about hat constitutes r-aci
or pregnancy discrimination.
119. See Transplant Surgery: Rejecting Rejection, T ECONOMIST, Aug. 23.1997, at 60
(noting that organ transplants require suppression of the immune stem).
120. This statement is not intended to endorse discriminaon against people with disabling
conditions or illnesses, but merely to point out that pregnancy differs frm a disability and is not
an illness. Persons with disabilities may be protected frum employment discrimination by the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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ation against pregnant women and that subordinate pregnant employees
to nonpregnant employees.
On the other hand, pregnant women in the workplace are sometimes
compared to nonpregnant, able-bodied employees. Interestingly, this too
reinforces the stereotype of pregnant women as disabled. A nice,
illustrative case is Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc.' In this well-
known case, the plaintiff was a pregnant nurse who objected to being
assigned to treat an HIV-positive patient with an opportunistic infection.
The plaintiff was not only concerned about the risk to a fetus in its first
trimester of development but also about the risk to her given that she had
developed gestational diabetes. 2 The court held that she had not made
out a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting
approach because the policy she challenged, which required nurses to
treat their assigned patients, had been applied in exactly the same way
to pregnant and nonpregnant employees.'2
In holding that the pregnant plaintiff should be compared to
nonpregnant, able-bodied nurses, the court again reinforces stereotypes
of pregnant women. It does not recognize the physiological changes that
occur when a woman becomes pregnant. Pam Armstrong's claim was
that her body was not the same in its ability to ward off disease as it was
before she became pregnant." Thus, she asserted, nonpregnant nurses
are really not similarly situated in their ability to work -as pregnant
nurses. In refusing to recognize differences, the court makes the plaintiff
sound like the stereotypical hysterical pregnant woman. By disregarding
her concerns for both the fetus's and her own health, it implies that she
exaggerated or made up the risks at stake here. Its recitation of the fact
that three other nurses became pregnant after Armstrong, and that they
all treated AIDS patients, makes her sound even more irrational."n The
court further reinforces the impression of Armstrong's hysteria by telling
us that her two nursing supervisors, both women, "did not understand
121. 33 F.3d 1308 (1lth Cir. 1994).
122. See id at 1310.
123. See id at 1314. The policy did make exceptions for some nurses. Those with "exudalive
(oozing) lesions or weeping dermatitis (inflamation of the skin)" were not to engage in patient care
until their conditions were bette. See id at 1311. The court also rjected a disparate impact claim
on the grounds that the adverse impact of the policy on pregnant women was the difficult decision
between the job and potential harm to her fetus. Citing Johnson Controls, the court found that there
was nothing wrong with imposing such a choice on women. See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc.,
33 F.3d at 1315-16.
124. She argued that gestational diabetes can weaken a woman's own immune system. See
i/, at 1310. Subsequently, an expert testified in deposition that a pregnant employee, even without
gestational diabetes, is more susceptible to disease than nonpregnant employees. See itt at 1315.
125. See id. at 1311. Another way to understand the situation, however, would be to
recognize that after Armstrong was fired for refusing to tet an HIV-positive patient, other pregnant
nurses may have felt as if they had no choice but to treat them. Armstrong's position may have been
one that the others wished they could follow.
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why Armstrong would refuse to see an HV-positive patient." Here,
we have two other trained nurses, both women, unable to understand
what the plaintiff's concerns are. How can she possibly be sane? Once
again, it is the courts' ability to use these stereotypes that makes its
decisions plausible. On reading the opinion, we feel as if the plaintiff
was asking for something to which she was not entitled-something that
an excessively emotional, pregnant woman might believe was crucial,
but which we rational, objective beings know is just an overreaction.
POSSIBULMES
Pregnant women are trapped by these stereotypes of who they are.
Because our culture normalizes negative stereotypes of pregnant women,
it is easy for us to accept that pregnant employees will compare
unfavorably with nonpregnant ones. Because we tend to separate the
realms of work and family, negative stereotypes of pregnant women that
make them appear unfit for the workplace ring true to us. The question
is, how can we think beyond the stereotypes that have historically
controlled our approaches to pregnancy in the workplace?
One possible solution to the problems that pregnant women face at
work is to invoke the terms of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).I The FMLA provides for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
for eligible employees because of either the birth of a child or because
of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform
on thejob.' Pregnancy-related complications count as a serious health
condition.'" If the need for the leave is due to a serious health
condition, the leave can even be taken intermittently.' The FMLA will
undoubtedly be helpful to many pregnant women, including those who
are required to take short periods of bedrest because of spotting or
cramping and those who must occasionally miss time at work for other
pregnancy-related reasons.
The FMLA also has serious limitations for pregnant women. First,
many pregnant women cannot afford to take advantage of the FMLA
because it mandates only unpaid leave. Second, the FMLA only pro-
vides a leave of twelve weeks. This will not be long enough for women
whose problems continue throughout the forty weeks of pregnancy.
Third, the FMLA is of no assistance to pregnant women who do not
want to take a leave, but simply want to be able to take a walk
periodically around their workplace or to eat small snacks at their desks.
In this way, it reinforces the stereotyped image of pregnant women as
126. Id. at 1311.
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
128. See id. § 2612 (1994).
129. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)Cu) (1997)..
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(6) (1994).
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unfit for work. The lesson of the FMLA is that if the woman's preg-
nancy is causing her to have difficulty with her usual work assignments,
her remedy is to leave the workplace.
Finally, and most significantly, the FMLA is subject to the possibility
of being misused against pregnant women instead of as a means of
protecting them. In the recent case of Harvender v. Norton Co., the
district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
against a plaintiff who claimed that the employer had violated the FMLA
by forcing her to take leave under the Act when she did not want it.13
2
When the plaintiff first informed her employer that she was pregnant, the
employer asked her to obtain a note from her doctor indicating that she
should be protected from exposure to hazardous chemicals since her job
as a lab technician exposed her to such chemicals approximately sixty
percent of the time. The plaintiff procured the requested note. Claiming
that there was no light duty work available, the employer then placed the
plaintiff on FMLA leave although the plaintiff never requested it and did
not want it.
The court upheld the employer's action on the grounds that plaintiff's
pregnancy was clearly a "serious health condition" under the FMLA and
that as a result of it she could not work with chemicals. The FMLA did
not guarantee her alternative employment. Therefore, the court
reasoned, she could be put on FMLA leave. 33
In the absence of the FMLA, this case would have forced the court to
address the issues left unaddressed in Johnson Controls. In Johnson
Controls, the Supreme Court had held that an employer's fetal protection
policy was unconstitutional, boldly proclaiming that the decision as to
whether to remain in a hazardous position while pregnant was a decision
for the pregnant woman alone."u Johnson Controls does not say what
happens to the pregnant woman who chooses not to remain in a position
that is potentially harmful to her fetus. 35 The Harvender court used the
131. No. 96.CV-653 (LIKIRWS), 1997 WL793085 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997).
132. See id at *8.
133. See id at *7-*8.
134. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Arm.
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
135. It is not clear from the Harvender court's opinion whether the plaintiff really chose to
leave her lab technician's position as a result of her pregnancy. She obtained the doctor's note in
response to the employer's request. The court stated:
Harvender does not assert that she approached Norton with the argument nor the
evidence that she was in fact willing and able to perform all of the elements of her
position. While it may be true that Harvender wished to continue working as a
laboratory technician, the fact remains that she could not perform an essential element
of that job and therefore could not perform the job satisfactorily.
Harvender v. Norton Co., No. 96-CV-653 (LEK/RWS), 1997 WL 793085. There is no evidence
that the plaintiff was physically unable to perform her job despite the court's assertion. Under
Johnson Controls, she was entitled to decide whether or not to stay on the job. Both the employer
and the court understood her presentation of the doctor's note as an indication that she chose not
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FMLA as a means of avoiding this issue. The FULA provided an easy
excuse. The plaintiff could be forced to take the unpaid leave and the
court did not need to face the issue of whether the plaintiff had been
discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy in either the initial
request for the doctor's note or in not finding alternative work for her.
Another possible solution to the problems that pregnant women
continue to face, according to some commentators, would be to rely on
the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).L'
Recently there have been a number of cases that have discussed whether
pregnancy is a disability, given the ADA's definition of a disability as
a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits ... [a] major
life activit[y]."' Unfortunately, the Federal Regulations cite pregnancy
as an example of a condition that does not fall within the definition of a
disability because it is not a physiological disorder."
One can still argue that specific, severe effects of the pregnancy are
disabling. The crucial issue then becomes: which of the troublesome
aspects of pregnancy are "normal" and which are the result of a
disabling "physiological disorder"? Numerous cases have held a variety
of pregnancy-related difficulties do not amount to disabilities under the
ADA while other cases have found that many of the same difficulties do
fit within the ADA's definition of disability."' Once again, as with the
cases relating to infertility and the postpartum period discussed in the
beginning of this Article, the courts have found themselves unable to
agree upon a biological definition of pregnancy.
to rmain on thejob. Whether she would have so chosen if she had kam that no light duty was
available, we cannot know because she was neer given that opportunity. To choose between a
potential risk to your child and your job is a terrible choice, but it is the choice that Johnson
Controls forces on her.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); see generally Matz-Ae, supra note 16.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
138. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997); see also Darian v. University of Mass. Boston.
980 F. Supp. 77, 85 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing 29 CFR 1630.2(h) (1995)). But see E-E.O.C.
Compliance Manual, Vol. 2, EEOC order 915.002, § 902.2(c)(3). cited in Darian, supra (stating
that pregnancy complications may be considered impairments).
139- Some cases hold that problems caused by the pregnancy are not coved by the ADA.
See, e.g., Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr, 926 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that limits
on weight lifting and hours vrviked per day ae not unusual circumstances for a pregacy); Johnson
v. A.P. Prods., 934 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that pregnancy is not coveted by the
ADA, even where the plaintiff claims that complications made her temporarily unable to work):
Kindlesparkerv. Metropolitan life Ins., No. 94-C-7542, 1995 WL 275576 (N.D. m. May 8,1995)
(finding that pregnancy-related conditions required medical attention); Gud=n f v. Stanffer
Communications, 922 F. Supp 465 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that plaintiff's morning sicknz,
nausea, back pain, sveling and headaches ae all part of a normal pregnancy); L.coparra v.
Pergament Home Ctrs., 982 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (reaching a smila conclusion regarding
spotting and cramping). Other cases hold that problems caused by the pregnancy ae covered by
the ADA. See, eg., Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon. No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL
106257 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1997) (incompetent cervix); Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274
(N.D. 1il 1995) (back pain); Datian v. Unvrsity of Mass. Boston. 980 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1997)
(student, not employee, with pregnancy-related pain).
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Even if the courts were able to agree on what aspects of pregnancy are
physiological disorders, the ADA would not be a useful vehicle for
accommodating many of the work-related problems that women face.
Most "normal" pregnancies involve a certain level of discomfort that
will interrupt the workplace's daily routines. Pregnant women with
uncomplicated pregnancies are likely to need frequent breaks to walk
around, use the rest room, or eat snacks." In the first trimester in
particular they are likely to experience morning sickness or exhaustion
that will affect their ability to arrive at work on time or to retain their
concentration while on the job. 4' To cover these under "physiological
impairment" would stretch that term to the point of meaninglessness. 4"
Women facing these common difficulties of pregnancy can hardly be
considered impaired.
In addition, bringing pregnancy under the ADA would reinvigorate
the stereotype of pregnant women as disabled and not fit for work.
Pregnant women have only been successful in asserting claims under the
ADA when their pregnancies resulted in significant impairment of their
normal ability to function, or when the pregnancy-induced condition
combined with an underlying disability. Thus, they have succeeded in
cases in which the doctor ordered complete bedrest as a result of an
incompetent cervix," in which there was severe pelvic pain that made
it impossible for the plaintiff to remain seated or to go upstairs," or in
which the pregnant woman experienced extreme back pain on top of a
preexisting back condition. 45 The implication is that the condition will
be covered by the ADA only if it fits the stereotype of being disabling."
To fit in this way, the normal inconveniences of pregnancy would have
to be significantly exaggerated. 47 To qualify for ADA coverage,
140. See, eg., Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. 1l. 1995) (noting the need
to walk around because of back pain); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, 922 F. Supp. 465
(D. Kan. 1996) (noting the need or desire for fequent snacks).
141. See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, 922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996);
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
142. The ADA is not intended to cover "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short
duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2G) (1997).
143. See Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL 106257
(N.D. IlL Feb. 10, 1997).
144. See Darian v. University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1997) (involving
an educational, rather than employment, setting).
145. See Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. M. 1995).
146. In Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., 982 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court
said: "[T"he question is whether the [pregnancy] complication itself (i.e., the 'impairment,' or
physiological disorder) is substantial enough to qualify as a 'disability,' regardless of the fact that
the woman is pregnant." Id at 227.
147. It is possible to read Patterson v. Xerox Corporation as providing more support for
pregnant employees who would like accommodation. The plaintiff in that case complained only
of severe back pain caused both by the pregnancy and a preexisting injury. Her doctor
recommended walking breaks evezy hour. Many pregnant women experience some level of back
pain. In finding that the plaintiff's condition was covered by the ADA, however, the court
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pregnant women will need to make theirconditions appear so severe that
they are not able to undertake a normal work life. This strengthens the
stereotype that pregnant women are too disabled to be part of the
workforce.
Others have argued that rather than fit pregnancy under the ADA, the
PDA should be amended to require accommodation in the same way that
the ADA does." At least one state has done this.' The danger here is
that the same stereotypes of disability will take over the analysis under
the PDA as under the ADA. For example, in Jacobson v. HeaItheast,"
a Minnesota case decided under state pregnancy and disability statutes
that require accommodations, the hearing officer barely mentioned the
pregnancy claim, while spending significant time on the disability
claim." As with the cases decided under the ADA, if a traditional
debilitating disability is not present, pregnancy is not seen as
necessitating accommodations.
One remaining strategy for reducing the covert use of stereotypes in
pregnancy discrimination cases is to distinguish between traits that are
due to the pregnancy and those that are not. In most of thb cases
discussed in this Article, the courts have allowed employers to take
actions against pregnant women so long as those actions can be
attributed to some trait or characteristic of the women other than the
pregnancy itself. By portraying the rationales for the terminations as
independent of the pregnancy, the courts can understand the cases as not
involving pregnancy discrimination. In many instances, however, the
characteristic or event for which the plaintiff was terminated is directly
related to the pregnancy. The stereotypes make this invisible. Cases in
which women are terminated merely because they are on pregnancy
leave are examples of this. The courts do not see the terminations as
pregnancy discrimination; instead, they see them as terminations because
the plaintiff was on leave. Another example is Troupe, in which the
employee was fired because the employer did not expect her to return
from pregnancy leave. Armstrong, in which the pregnant plaintiff
refused to treat an HIV-positive patient because of fear that the
pregnancy had weakened her immune system, is another example. In all
of these cases, if the plaintiff had not been pregnant, the critical trait
would not have existed. If the stereotypes of pregnant women as unfit
emphasized t the pain was due not only to the pregnanc, but also to the preexisting injury. 71e
latter meant that the pain's duration could not be foreseen, but that it might not be temporary or of
short duration. See Patierson v. Xerox Corp. 901 F. Supp. at 278. Mds nppears to limit its
usefulness for later pregnant plaintiffs.
148. See, eg., illsap, supra note 16, at 1428-50.
149. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, subd. 1(5) (West 1991) (prohibiting pregnany
discrimination and creating a duty to make "reasonable accommodations").
150. Deborah Jean Jacobson, No. 8-1700-6953-2, DHR File No. E23494 (bfinn. Dep't of
Hum. Rts. July 1993), available in 1993 WL 852242.
151. Seegenerally id.
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to work had not been so strong, the courts might have seen the
relationship between the operative characteristic and the pregnancy.
Situations like these need to be contrasted with cases in which the
characteristic that interferes with work simply exists independently in a
pregnant woman. For example, the fact that a woman is pregnant should
not protect her against dismissal if she engages in excessive, morale-
undermining phone use while pregnant, 2 or if, unconnected with her
pregnancy, she is unable to perform her job." Pregnancy, after all, does
not confer on the plaintiff an immunity from unrelated, adverse job
determinations.
Interpreting the PDA in this way would require the court to identify
when the operative trait or condition is a result of the plaintiff's
pregnancy. In In re Carnegie Assocs., Judge McKee recognized that
employers historically discriminated against pregnancy because of
assumptions about pregnant women." "[E]mployers," he wrote, "have
assumed that female employees may become pregnant and that
pregnancy would make them unavailable for work."'55 He argued that
the protections of the PDA are meaningless unless they extend to
characteristics or events that are "endemic" to pregnancy, such as
absence from work. 56 This is an argument in favor of recognizing the
ways in which stereotypes of pregnancy affect our assessment of
occurrences, like lateness, the need for frequent breaks, or the inability
to stand for long periods.
If the particular trait or event on which the employer is basing the
action is found to be due to the pregnancy, one way of protecting the
plaintiff would be to switch the burden of locating an appropriate
comparative group to the employer. As indicated above, locating a
comparative group is often extremely difficult. Thus, for example, if the
pregnant plaintiff has been fired because she was repeatedly late for
work due to morning sickness, it would be the employer's responsibility
to show that other employees who were late just as frequently, but were
not pregnant, were also fired. This would make sense because the
employer has better access to the comparative data than the plaintiff. It
would also make sense because it would recognize the power of the
stereotype that women with morning sickness should not be in the
workplace. Once the lateness is connected to the morning sickness, why
should we not assume that the stereotype has influenced the employer's
152. See Visco v. Community Health Plan, 957 F. Supp. 381 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
complaints about excessive phone use began before announcement of pregnancy and, subsequent
to announcement, were well corroborated by other employees).
153. See Afande v. National Lutheran Home for the Aged, 868 F. Supp. 795 (D. Md. 1994)
(noting the plaintiffs poor evaluations prior to and during pregnancy).
154. See In re Camegie Assocs., 129 F. 3d 290,299 (3d Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 305.
156. See id
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judgment as to how seriously to treat the lateness? If this is not the case,
let the employer prove it.
Although most courts have not recognized the problem of stereotypes
or the promise of switching the burden, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois has, on occasion, been willing to overlook
the complete absence of comparative data from a plaintiff's case. In
EEOC v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp.,m the district court recognized
that there are many different types of acceptable evidence from which
to draw an inference of intent to discriminate."' In one case--yet
another of the cases in which the plaintiff's employment was terminated
while she was on pregnancy leave-the court found that failure to show
similar treatment of comparable, nonpregnant employees was not fatal
to the plaintiff's case. 59 In a second case, the same court held that the
plaintiff could make out a prima facie case if she simply showed that a
nonpregnant employee was treated more favorably than she was."6 The
plaintiff was not required to show that the nonpregnant employee was
similarly situated in all ways except for pregnancy. Both of these cases
indicate a recognition of the difficulties for the plaintiff of forcing her
to identify a comparative group of employees and to prove that the
situation for which she was fired was connected to the pregnancy. The
unconscious use of stereotypes is part of why this is so difficult.
Another way for courts to identify the role of stereotypes is for them
to focus on the actual ability of pregnant women to work. Ensley-Gaines
v. Runyon' provides an example of a court that did this. In Ensley-
Gaines, the plaintiff requested light duty (sitting) assignments because
of her pregnancy, but was given relatively few. In contrast, sitting work
was regularly assigned to employees who needed it because of on-the-
job injuries. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
issue was whether the plaintiff and the employees injured on the job
were similarly situated in their ability to work. If they were, neither the
genesis of their condition nor collective-bargaining obligations would
justify treating the plaintiff differently. " " On remand, the defendant
would have to prove that the reason why it refused to assign the pregnant
plaintiff to as much light duty work as employees injured on the job was
not merely a pretext for discrimination. This will necessitate affirmative
proof by the employer, it will not be able to rely merely on stereotypes.
157. EEOC v. North%e-tern Mem'l Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. IL 1994).
158. See id. at 767.
159. See id.
160. See Crnoknak v. Evangelical Health Sys, 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
161. 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996).
162. See i at 1226. But see Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 F3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding no violation of the PDA to provide light duty to those injured on the job and not to
pregnant employees).
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The crucial step in protecting pregnant employees from adverse
employment decisions based on discriminatory stereotypes is to force
courts and employers to focus on the employees' abilities. This can be
done by requiring the employer to prove how comparable employees
have been treated. It can also be done by mandating, as in Ensley-
Gaines, that if any employees are treated better than the pregnant
employee, the employer will have the burden of proving that this is not
discriminatory. It could also be done, as in Minnesota, by requiring
employers to accommodate the needs of the pregnant employee, and then
by paying close attention to ensure that stereotypes did not creep into the
analysis.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the method, the lesson of this Article is that we must
encourage courts to be vigilant against the use of unconscious
stereotypes in deciding pregnancy discrimination cases. These stereo-
types have inserted themselves insidiously into the interpretation of the
law. Their use has gone primarily undetected. They are used to claim
that pregnancy should be interpreted according to a narrow biological
definition. Their acceptance makes the discriminatory nature of deroga-
tory comments about pregnancy pass unnoticed. They go to the core of
pregnancy discrimination law, influencing our conception of how
pregnant women act, and thus the comparisons between pregnant and
nonpregnant employees. The continuing role of stereotypes in preg-
nancy discrimination law means that pregnant women continue to be
subordinated to nonpregnant people (particularly men) in the workplace.
We cannot avoid this situation by continuing to claim that pregnant
women are like nonpregnant persons in all ways except the fetus
growing within. That claim reinforces the position that, if they are dif-
ferent, they do not belong in the workplace. Instead, we must learn to
discuss openly the problems that pregnant women specifically have in
their particular jobs. We must focus on the, stereotypes that make courts
see these women as unable to perform. When the problematic char-
acteristics derive from the woman's pregnancy, we must be especially
skeptical of disabling stereotypes. The PDA should not be allowed to
become a site for reengrafting these stereotypes on pregnant women.
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